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Economics and the Easter Island Metaphor
Thomas R. Dalton, R. Morris Coats, and Leon Tay/or*
FOLLOWING THE PUBLICATION of Brander and Taylor's1998 paper, "The simple economics of Easter Island: A
Ricardo-Malthus model of renewable resource use," in the
American Economic Review, resource economists have been
interested in further developing a model to show how con-
flict, human institutions and customs, and technological
change might act and interact to exacerbate or ameliorate the
feast-famine or predator-prey cycle that caused catastrophe
on Easter Island (Rapa Nui). The island is seen as a useful
metaphor for the interaction of humans with their natural en-
vironment and danger that the planet will collapse. Indeed,
Malthus, following the voyages of Captain James Cook, saw
islands and the population problems that islanders face as
metaphors for the earth's population problems.
Though the barriers to a further increase of
population be not so well defined, and so open to
common observation, on continents as on islands,
yet they still present obstacles that are nearly as
insurmountable; and the emigrant, impatient of the
distresses which he feels in his own country, is by
no means secure of flllding relief in another. There
is probably no island yet known, the produce of
which could not be further increased. This is all
that can be said of the whole earth.... The question
that is asked in Captain Cook's first Voyage, with
respect to the thinly scattered savages of New
Holland, "By what means the inhabitants of this
country are reduced to such a number as it can
subsist?" may be asked with equal propriety
respecting the most populous islands in the South
Sea, or the best peopled countries in Europe and
Asia. The question, applied generally, appears to
me to be highly curious, and to lead to the
elucidation of some of the most obscure, yet
important points, in the history of human society.
Reverend Thomas Robert Malthus
(Ch. V in paragraph I.Y.l,1826)
INTRODUCTION
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE FAR-FLU G ISLA DS of the Pacific
is one of the great achievements of pre-industrial civilization.
The variety of island types, including small volcanic masses
and coral atolls as well as larger and more verdant islands,
and their wide dispersal across the Pacific - from tropical to
temperate climatic zones - presented small colonizing groups
with significant adaptive challenges and provided numerous
opportunities for experiments in human adaptation in isolated
environments (Barthel 1978; Finney et al. 1989).
More than a dozen marginally habitable islands have
archaeological records of prehistoric settlement for varying
periods of time. All of these societies had declined and virtu-
ally disappeared before the an'ival of Europeans in the 181h
centmy. The sophistication and stability of these early colo-
nies as well as their disappearance has prompted an extensive
amount of research to reveal the mechanisms by which they
prospered and failed (Bender et al. 2002; Kirch 1986; Mulloy
1979). Research has been multi-disciplinary, including contri-
butions from archaeology, biology and, recently, economics.
This article summarizes economic research that uses mathe-
matical simulation to examine various features of the growth
and decay of insular populations, emphasizing the experience
on Easter Island.
Easter Island is well known, primarily for its moai, but
the population pattern tbat emerges there is typical: an initial
period of sustained prosperity, I followed by rapid decline
with falling welfare as the resource base of the island was
depleted. This pattern suggests that unregulated resource ex-
ploitation caused a feast and famine cycle that overtaxed the
capacity of the resource base and eventually led to the col-
lapse of the society.
Malthus is probably the most famous of the early mod-
ern thinkers to address the population problem, noting that
human population and the natural ecological system were on
a collision course because, according to Malthus, the expo-
nential growth of populations would exceed the linear growth
in agricultural advances and thus outstrip our abilities to feed
ourselves: food supply limitations lead to population limita-
tions. He notes that tbe system will have several possible so-
lutions or resolutions (several possible steady-state equilibria)
to limit population growth, such as famine, war, disease, in-
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1 Polynesian settlement of Easter Island probably began somewhere around the 9th century, though one site, the so-called Poike ditch, has char-
coal dated from 320-670 A.D. as discussed in Martinsson-Wallin and Crockford (200 I) who give a range for the earliest settlement from the 7th
to the Illh century. The period of prosperity lasted until the 14th century. The single Poike ditch sample is discounted because the earliest set-
tlers surely had access to an ample supply of driftwood for fuel. Dates coming from trees that could have been dead for centuries before being
used for fuel make carbon dating of settlement difficult.
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sufficient nutrition for children, and other natural limits to
population.2 In later editions of his book, Malthus also men-
tions that various social institutions to reduce bilihs, such as
late marriages, social sanctions against early motherhood, and
sterilization could lead to a more stable population]
Malthus thus sees institutions as a check on population
growth and a way around the social collapse that his theory
predicts. Hardin (1968), Gordon (1954), and Coase (1960)
have pointed out the particular role of property-rights institu-
tions and/or the costs of transacting in over-grazing, over-
fishing, and over-hunting, as well as in all other pollution
problems. Economists have also analyzed the unsustainable
use of natural resources as a problem due to common-
propeliy institutions. They believe that private property-rights
regimes can induce users to consider the cost of their actions
in terms of lost reproduction of the natural resomce. For in-
stance, the American bison were wastefully slaughtered,
while cattle were slaughtered in far greater numbers, but at
sustainable rates, with great market value placed on bulls,
because one bull could sire many calves per year. The repro-
ductive stock was important capital to be guarded and kept in
good health. Bison could only be owned by slaughtering
them, so that the only "good (market-valued) bison was a
dead bison." More recently, Ostrom (1990) suggests that the
problem of over-exploitation is due more specifically to open-
access common property rights regimes and that there are
common property regimes where access is limited somehow,
which we often see among indigenous peoples in traditional
societies.
All of the work done in this literature builds upon the
work of Brander and Taylor (1998). In our review of the eco-
nomics literature on Easter Island, we first present the eco-
nomic model proposed in their seminal work, which simu-
lated the Malthusian history of Easter Island's feast-famine or
predator-prey cycles of people and resomce base. Then we
tum to modifications of the Brander and Taylor model that
examine the three influences of institutions, teclmological
growth, and war, as well as the interplay of these influences.
Finally, we examine some recent work done outside of eco-
nomics on Easter Island by Diamond (2005) and Rolett and
Diamond (2004).
SIMULATION OF GROWTH AND DECLI E
o EASTER ISLA D
BRANDER A D TAYLOR (1998) initiated the current economic
interest in the somewhat isolated development of Easter Is-
land by constmcting a simulated model of its prehistoric
economy, based on biological and cultural parameters that
closely approximate conditions that researchers believe ex-
isted at its founding. Brander and Taylor (B&T) develop a
simple model of the Easter Island economy, using parameters
from Balm and Flenley's (1992) review of the archaeological
research of Easter Island 4 Brander and Taylor employ a
Lotka (1925) - VoltelTa (1931) predator-prey dynamic model
based on Schaefer's model of resource dynamics and Malthu-
sian model of human population dynamics, such that the
growth rate in the human population depends on the resource
stock and on the harvest of that stock. This "economic"
model of the island does not presuppose modem economic
institutions, such as money, but rather examines the changes
in human consumption choices when faced with changing
production capabilities, given the sorts of trading or sharing
anangements we might surmise existed on prehistoric Easter
Island.
The Brander and Taylor (1998) model has two main
interacting functions: a resource stock function which de-
pends both on its natural rate of growth as well as on the rate
at which the resource is harvested, and a population stock
function which also depends on the amount of the resource
harvested. The resource stock at time t is Set). The growth
rate of the resource stock is equal to the natural growth rate of
the resource, G(S(t)) minus the harvest rate, H(t), so that
dS/dt = G(S) - H (sans time argument t). (I)
The logistic form of G, bonowed from Schaefer (1957),
is
G(S) = rS( I-S/K), (2)
where K is the canying capacity, or the maximum size of the
resource stock, and I' is the intrinsic growth rate of the re-
source, its regeneration rate.
The rate of harvesting, H, is both based on a constant
fraction of the resource stock and the population of workers
used in harvesting, LH (simplifying by asswning that the en-
tire population works, but this assumption is not necessalY to
their stOlY):
(3)
where a is a constant between 0 and 1. Whatever labor that is
not used to harvest the resource is used in manufacturing a
good that we will just call M, a composite good of tools,
housing, maai constmction and so forth. The labor devoted to
manufacturing is denoted, LM . The total labor supply, or sim-
ply the population, is denoted as L. Thus, L = L1_1+ LM.
Since we can choose units, we can define one unit of M
as the amount produced by one unit of labor, so that the wage,
2 "The positive checks to population are extremely various, and include evelY cause, whether arising from vice or misery, which in any degree
contributes to shorten the natural duration of human life. Under this head, therefore, may be enumerated all unwholesome occupations, severe
labour and exposure to tbe seasons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children, great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole train of common
diseases and epidemics, wars, plague, and famine." Malthus 6th ed 1826, paragraph I.Il.9.
3Malthus 6th ed 1826, Chapter V in paragraph I.V.l
4 It should be noted that the Balm and FlenJey's (1992) interpretation of Easter's prehistory and particularly its collapse is not as accepted today
as it was when Brander and Taylor published their work. See, for example, Rainbird 2001.
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growth (2) into the change in the renewable resource equation
(1), yields
If the stock of the resource falls, the productivity of la-
bor in the resource sector of the economy falls and the pro-
ductive ability of the economy is reduced.
Fertility in the B&T model depends on per capita re-
source consumption, so that population growth, dS/dt, is
based on the current population, L; on underlying birth and
death rates, denoted as band d, respectively; and on a fertility
function, F, that is based on a positive constant, <p, of the per
capita consumption of the resource good, H/L. From (9) we
see that H/L = apS, then
W,5 must equal I. Prices are defined in terms of the manufac-
tured good, M (which is a nUl1leraire good, the price of which
is n01111al ized to 1).
Both manufacturing and harvesting occur under condi-
tions of free entry. Since there is open access to the harvest-
ing, there is no rental COS{l or user cost for the resource S.
The only cost of the resource is the cost of harvesting it. The
price of a resource or harvested good is p, which must equal
its unit cost of production because of the free ently condition,
or open access, so that p = w/aS, or p = lIaS.
B&T employ a general and flexible instantaneous utility
function tenned a Cobb-Douglas utility function to provide
preferences, so that utility, u, is
(4)
dS/dt = rS(I-S/K) - apLS. (11 )
5 Note that because we are dealing with a mostly prehistoric socicty and there is no evidence that money was used, wages in this literature refer
to the goods the average worker receives as his share of the output, in terms of the amount of the manufactured goods for which his output
could be traded.
6 Again, since there are no monetary units here, rental and user costs do not refer to monetary costs. The term "user cost" refers to costs of using
the resource now over and above harvesting or extraction costs. These costs are due to losses in future value of the resource from using it today
and making it less available in the future. "User cost," then is a cost due to people's awareness of the resource's future scarcity, not just its cur-
rent scarcity.
7 While we use the palm resource in our discussions, following Brander and Taylor (1998), we recognize that the palm forest was not directly a
food resource. However, the palm was a critical resource as wood for cooking and for protecting the soil. Diamond (2005: I04) mentions 21
other known species of trees that had once been on Easter Island, but bccame extinct. Among these were hardwoods that were known to be used
for canoes elsewhere in Polynesia. Canoes were vital for off-shore fishing. Brander and Taylor (1998: J22) suggest that the loss of the forests
around 1400 led to less protein in diets and that the reduction in forest cover led to reduced water retention in the soil, and soil erosion. Addi-
tionally, we can think of this instead as a generic renewable resource that can be depleted through harvesting at rates faster than the growth of
the resource, for instance, the overexploitation of birds on the island, as Anderson (2002) discusses.
Total demand is simply L times the individual demand,
so that
(12)dS/dt = L(b - d + <papS)
Brander and Taylor (1998) note that equations (II) and
(12) form a two-equation system of differential equations, a
variation of the Lotka-Volterra predator-prey model. Brander
and Taylor used the parameters in Table 1. First, the time-
period is set at a decade. The carrying capacity parameter, K,
is largely chosen for convenience, so that the resource stock
and the population will be similar in size. The fertility pa-
rameter, <p, is set at 4, so that as long as the resource stock
satisfies S 2: .5K (half the carrying capacity of the island) the
population grows. If the stock is less than .5K, the population
declines. The net population growth when the resource stock
is driven to extinction is -.1, declining 10 percent per decade.
The parameter p shows the relative preference for the re-
source good and the share of the labor force devoted to har-
vesting the resource. B&T suggest that there is evidence that
somewhat less than half of the work of Easter Islanders was
devoted to harvesting, so that 0.4 is in a reasonable range.
Setting a = .00001 would let a household harvest enough so
that it could reproduce itself with just 20 percent of its labor
time if the resource stock were at canying capacity. The value
of r is based on what is known about the reproduction of
palms with Easter Island's soil and climate.? According to
Dransfield et al (1984) the palm forest on Easter Island was a
species of Jubaea Chilensis, which grows nowhere else in







H = upLS and
m = w(l- P).
M = w(l- P)L.
h = wp/p and
H = wpUp and (7)
The equilibrium harvest rate may exceed the biological
growth rate G, so that the resource stock may shrink. Substi-
tuting our (temporary) equilibrium harvest (9) from biological
At any moment t, the resource is fixed at Set), and the
population is fixed at L(t). Using all labor, the temporary
equilibrium is at w = 1, such that
where hand m represent the individual level of consumption
of the resource and the manufactured good, respectively and
Pis a parameter of the utility function, a constant between 0
and I. The utility function is maximized subject to the instan-
taneous budget constraint, ph + m = w, yielding optimal
amounts of hand m consumed per worker:
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B&T also use 40 as the initial value for the
population, L, in AD 400, when Polynesians
were first thought to arrive on Easter Island and
12,000 (carrying capacity, K) as the initial value
for S.9 A simulation of Easter Island's economy,
based on equations (11) and (12) and the initial
values of Land S and the parameter values from
Table I, is shown in Figure 1. 10 Both the level of
the resource stock (the palm forest) and the size
of the population are modeled over time. Figure
2 shows the dynamics of the model in a phase
diagram, showing the convergence to the steady
state. The gray line is drawn at the steady state
value of the resource and the black line shows
the convergence to the steady state. B&T further
show that if the intrinsic growth rate of the
palms, r, were higher, much like that of coconut
and other palms that grow elsewhere in Polyne-
sia, in the range of .35 instead of .04, then the
model almost converges, but the cycles are so
muted that adjustment paths are nearly mono-
tonic. Even with intrinsic growth rates much
smaller, around .15 to .2, any population "crash"
would be too small to be noticed.
B&T extend their discussion to many other
cases of civilization collapse, including the other
mystery islands of Polynesia, where societies
were known to have collapsed, as well as cases
in Polynesia where intrinsic growth rates were
higher than on Easter Island and collapse did not
occur.
Figure 2. Phase Diagram.
8 Brander and Taylor (1998) summarize the known prehistory of Easter Island and provide a detailed justification for the parametric values they
use. See, in particular, pages 128-129. As mentioned before, research done since has cast doubt upon some of these parameters.
9 Brander and Taylor (1998) relied on early carbon dating information, based on the Poike ditch charcoal carbon dating. Since Brander and
Taylor, the opinion on first settlement of Rapa Nui has shifted from 400 A.D to around 800 A.D. or even later (Martinsson-Wallin and Crock-
ford, 2001). However, Brander and Taylor also followed Mulloy and Figureroa (1978) considering that there was a single settlement of the
island and its population evolved in isolation. This single-isolated-settlement theory has been challenged by Green (1998, 2000), Weisler (1998)
and Martinsson-Wallin (1994). So if we replace Brander and Taylor's start date of 400 A.D. with 800 A.D. and add several hundred new set-
tlers after that, the population and resource trajectories are near those of Brander and Taylor. Tn Figure 3 we show Brander and Taylor's model
with an initial population set at 400 instead of an unknown number of injections of unknown numbers of immigrants at various unknown dates
and original settlement beginning in 800 A.D. While the human population does not increase to around 10,000, as with the original parameters,
the same pattern emerges. This may be because early establishing populations may have higher birth and lower death rate parameters than
Brander and Taylor use throughout their work.
10 This simulation reproduces the result obtained by Brander and Taylor (1998: 129).
Rapa Nui Journal 100 Vol. 20 (2) October 2006
4
Rapa Nui Journal: Journal of the Easter Island Foundation, Vol. 20 [2006], Iss. 2, Art. 4
https://kahualike.manoa.hawaii.edu/rnj/vol20/iss2/4
The fish were quite small, generally about the size
of a herring, and of every variety of color. About
one-eighth of the whole being reserved for the use
of the Ti [the aristocracy] itself, the remainder was
divided into numerous small packages, which
were immediately dispatched in every direction to
the remotest part of the valley. AITived at their
destination, they were in tum portioned out, and
At least a hundred of the natives were bringing
materials to the ground, some carrying in their
hands one or two of the canes which were to form
the sides, others slender rods of the hibiscus,
stnmg with palmetto leaves, for the roof. Every
one contributed something to the work; and by the
united, but easy, and even indolent, labors of all,
the entire work was completed before sunset.
(Melville 1921 :298).
200
He also describes the typical approach to production
and distribution. Fish harvests were consolidated and par-
celed out according to rank.
180
this case, the common-property owners have an
Population incentive to use the resource now before everyone
Resource Stock else overuses it in the future, so the resource is
overused now. While cooperation and self-
regulation benefit the community as a whole by
preserving resomce stocks, personal gains accrue
by cheating on agreed-upon harvest quotas while
personal losses accumulate when others cheat.
Consequently, a declining resource stock increases
the percentage of time devoted to current harvest-
ing when the stock is common property. The incen-
tives are very different under exclusive, personal
ownership institutions. In this case, the resource
owner has an unambiguous desire to conserve the
renewable resource. A declining stock decreases the
percentage of time devoted to current harvesting
under resource-ownership institutions because the
resource owner is concerned both with current lev-
els of consumption and with the future availability
of the resource, both of which are under his control.
The Polynesian society that had developed on the larger
islands situated in an archipelago adequately handled the
resource allocation problem in more hospitable environ-
ments. At the time of the settlement of Easter Island, the so-
ciety was somewhat egalitarian in the sense that everyone
was guaranteed a minimum level of consumption through the
institutionalized right of consumption by each person. Of
course, in a hierarchical society, those of higher rank con-
sumed more, but the consumption right was at the core of an
economic system based on religious principles and rigid
class distinctions. Often, this approach to economic activity
involved the communal production of private goods. Hennan
Melville's (1921) description of the construction of a house










... our analysis of Easter Island and the other cases
suggests that economic decline based on natural
resource degradation is not uncommon.
Institutional change could potentially have averted
the collapse in many of these societies but was not
undertaken (or at least was not undertaken fast
enough). Institutional failure in renewable
resource use does happen and it has been fatal for




Such speculation is natural for economists because
many of them view differences in economic prosperity as
reflections of differences in institutional aITangements. The
work of North (1990, 1991, 1994) and Williamson (1985)
concentrated on the link between economic institutions and
economic history. Institutions can affect economic develop-
ment and the course of evolution in a number of ways: by
influencing attitudes toward work, savings and investment
behavior, risk taking, consumption propensities and other
characteristics of producers and consumers.
The production (or harvesting) function for the resource
stock is affected by the property-rights institutions. Price is
the allocation mechanism in a market environment, inducing
some sensitivity to changes in the size of the resource stock
by its owners. However, the reaction of common-propelty
owners and exclusive owners to changing resource stocks is
quite different. Common-property owners surely recognize
that harvesting is a zero-sum game: the more that is har-
vested by others, the less remains for them. The zero-sum
nature of harvesting is an important consideration when a
renewable resource stock can be exhaustively harvested. In
RULES AND PRACTICES OF A SOCIETY, its institutions, can
bring about a more sustainable system. Brander and Taylor,
for example, note that institutional change might have
avoided social collapse:
SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATIONS
Figure 3. Brander and Taylor case, with initial population at 400 and original settle-
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equally distributed among the various houses of
each particular district. (Melville 1921: 303)
The common pattem was to use conununal production
when possible and to redistribute other output periodically in
order to equalize consumption levels among the population.
Tlu'ee classes of citizens shared in this distribution; the two
primary classes were the aristocracy and commoners. While
commoners could own land and produce some of the food
and manufactured goods that they consumed, much of their
production became conUl1Unal property distributed by the
chiefs. Personal ownership of the factors of production by
commoners was severely limited. The chiefs, on the other
hand, believed to be descended from the gods, had a divine
right to dispossess the lower classes of their land and other
goods. They further controlled the lives of the conUl10ners by
regularly collecting food and manufactured goods for redistJ-i-
bution. A third, intennediate status level evolved because the
chiefs needed stewards to supervise this production and redis-
tribution system. Marshall Sahlins (1958) explains the rela-
tionship between status and consumption.
The tlu'ee status levels were the focal points of the
collection of larger and larger amounts of surplus
food and manufactured goods and of their
redistribution. A collection by a high chief
necessitated prior collection by local stewards
from, in tum, the commoners. Distribution
followed the same pattem. Most of the goods so
collected reached the producers eventually,
especially goods collected for feasts (Sahlins
1958:16-17).
Polynesian chiefs function as central agents in
large-scale redistributions of food and other goods.
All stewards, in fact, have this perogative, but the
higher the rank of the chief, the greater his
distributive activities in ten11S of the amount of
goods and people encompassed. The redistributive
process provides the economic basis for the
celebration of great religious ceremonies,
including the rites of crisis in chiefly families, and
for other community activities, such as warfare and
communal labor. In many areas it also provides the
mechanism for distributing food in famine periods.
To engage in redistribution, chiefs must have call
upon the goods produced in the households of the
conu11Lll1ity (ibid.:7-8).
The property rights structure was one of the right of
consumption rather than one of resource ownership. Each
individual received an amount related to his status, regardless
of his individual productivity. The level of consumption of
each individual was dictated by tradition and religious princi-
ples rather than the level of individual output. Aristocrats, for
example, engaged in very little productive activity but gener-
ally received disproportionately large distributions. Little
mobility among classes existed and productive tasks varied
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little over time or among the classes. Both the level of pro-
ductive activity and the division of time among various tasks
was fixed by tradition.
A basic reason that the feast-famine cycle plagued
Easter Island was that the consumption-rights economy did
not have sufficient flexibility to respond to changing environ-
mental conditions because incentives to produce and incen-
tives to forego consumption are weaker in a consumption-
rights society than in one based on private ownership of re-
sources. Institutional inflexibility in this case was the result
both of ignorance about the underlying source of the resource
depletion and of cultural rigidities that did not encourage in-
dividuals to properly incorporate available information about
declining harvests into their production and consumption
decisions. Both technological and institutional change re-
quires ilUlovation, and innovation requires many minds at-
tempting to solve the problems that people face. Simon
(1996) and Boserup (1965), as well as Dalton et al. (2005),
suggest that the larger the regularly interacting population,
the higher the rate of innovation. Easter Island probably did
not have a population large enough to produce the level of
ilU1ovation to surmount the Malthusian population problem.
Falling harvests reflect poorly on the ruling class in a con-
sumption-rights culture, calling into question both their di-
vine right to govern and their sensitivity to the needs of the
population. It is understandable in this institutional environ-
ment that the rate of harvesting is maintained as stocks fall
since the political stability of the society is threatened by con-
sumption shortfalls.
Diamond (2005) points out that, according to oral tradi-
tions, Easter Island's chiefs and priests claimed kinship to the
gods, defending their elite status with promises of abundant
harvests. As the population outgrew their deforested island's
ability to support them, the promises of the elite began to ring
hollow, leading to a revolt by military leaders in about 1680,
destroying the hold of the existing political and religious es-
tablishment. With the overthrow of the chiefs and priests
came the overtuming of the elite's statues.
Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, et at. (1994) provide per-
suasive arguments that efficient allocation mechanisms some-
times occurred in traditional societies, but that factors often
conspire (in traditional and in more advanced societies) to
thwart the evolution toward institutions that better preserve
the resource base. The most important inhibitor of evolution
toward more conservation is an absence of consensus about
the source of the problem. For example, if the society incor-
rectly attributes crop failure to low rainfall when soil exhaus-
tion is the problem, then it will seek institutional changes that
can increase the frequency of rain. It will not focus on creat-
ing property rights structures to protect the land. Other factors
that can influence the direction of change include the degree
to which the changes create winners and losers and the cost of
enforcing the changes. Changes that produce many losers will
be resisted more successfully than changes that affect all par-
ties similarly. Changes that are costly to enforce will probably
not persist.
The Polynesian institutions that performed well on is-
lands with hospitable soil and climatic conditions proved in-
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sufficient to maintain society under less favorable conditions.
For a variety of reasons, societies on Easter Island and the so-
called "mystery islands," such as Pitcairn and Christmas, did
not sufficiently adapt to the different environments. In order
to sort out the influence of environment and institutions on
the development of these economies, recent work has simu-
lated the evolution of growth and development under various
institutional assumptions in addition to the institutions that
actually existed.
For example, Dalton and Coats (2000) examine the
same Easter Jsland economy model as did Brander and Taylor
but with a parameter representing the degree to which private
property rights govern the use of the resource stock. As the
property-rights parameter goes from an open-access com-
mons to a private property-rights regime in the resource
stock, the feast-famine cycle is dampened. They compare two
institutional alternatives to the consumption rights society.
The first is the traditional approach to open-access harvesting
of the natural resource. Open access exists when the resource
is considered the common property of the community and all
citizens have an equal right to harvest it. This institutional
framework provides for conm10n ownership of the natural
resource and protects the right of any individual to keep what
is personally harvested. In addition to open-access harvesting,
they examine a second alternative to consumption rights, the
right of exclusive, personal ownership of the natural resource,
or simply, private property rights.
Brander and Taylor do not predict, as an equilibrium, the
state of affairs discovered by the Dutch at Easter Island in
1722. Rather than the small population surviving without its
extinct resource, Brander and Taylor predict a stable equilib-
rium with positive levels of both population and the resource
base. The Dutch found about 3,000 islanders but no trees.
D'Alessandro (2005) predicts this outcome in a dynamic Ri-
cardian model of two sectors based on an inexhaustible re-
source, "com," and an exhaustible resource, "palm trees."
Teclmological change that boosts the harvest, or an increase
in the demand for palm trees, may bring this slowly growing
resource to extinction. The diminished population then sur-
vives on corn, albeit with zero utility.
Most of the Easter Island economics literature assumes
that people have equal access to the resource; that property
rights to it are not well defined. D'Alessandro accepts this
assumption but explores how varying regimes of ownership
of corn (grain) land may affect the exhaustible resource. Her
model incorporates "landowners," who receive rents from
corn (rents are defu1ed here as an excess of revenues above
costs; and since there is no money in her model, revenues and
costs must be understood in terms of physical goods, such as
com, so that rents become a difference between output and
inputs valued in units of corn); and workers, who divide all
product net of the rents. Property rights are said to be highly
concentrated when landowners receive the entire rent, spend-
ing (trading) it solely on a luxury good produced with the
exhaustible resource. (Workers may choose between the har-
vest and corn.) When property rights are diffused, harvesters
may also receive part of the rent, which they spend on harvest
and corn. Property rights are completely diffused when har-
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vesters receive the full rent. Finally, D'Alessandro examines
the case of no well-defined property rights, where land is
common property, such as the exhaustible resource. All indi-
viduals are workers in this case.
When only a few individuals own land, the harvest is
larger than in the other cases of property ownership, since the
landowners demand luxury goods rather than corn. This out-
come may exhaust the natural resource stock if the preference
of workers for corn is weak, implying that they demand much
harvest for subsistence. The exhaustible resource is more
likely to be preserved in the case of diffused property rights,
since this case implies a shift in demand from harvest to COlll.
The Brander and Taylor model asserts a stable equilib-
rium with positive levels of population and of the resource
base. They do not explicitly model a scenario that leads to
extinction of the reSOLU'ce with a surviving population. Con-
rad (2005) develops a similar model where the ease with
which a resource can be harvested is a factor and where the
harvest may drive a renewable resource below the level at
which it may sustain itself. Denote the resource as X; its in-
trinsic growth rate as r; the minimum level for the resource to
sustain itself as K o; the maximum level at which the resource
may sustain itself - its calTying capacity - as K,; and the ef-
f0l1 in harvesting the resource as E. Then Conrad models the
instantaneous change in the resource as
X = rX(X/Ko-l)(f-X/K,)-qXE (13)
where q expresses the ease in harvesting the resource.
This "catchability coefficient" may also be interpreted as a
technology parameter. The first term on the right-hand side
gives the growth in the resource; the second term gives the
harvest. Conrad finds that, if property rights are absent, then
harvesting will drive the resource to extinction if
cI(P-s)q < (Ko+Kj)/2 (14)
where c is the unit cost of harvest effort and p-s is the
market price of the resource minus shipping costs. He finds
that the resource is likely to become extinct if it is easy and
valuable to harvest. Counter to intuition, the intrinsic rate of
growth of the resource plays no role in Conrad's sufficiency
condition for this equilibrium, a conclusion that bears on the
Easter Island debate because Brander and Taylor (1998: 129)
argue that the island's resource base had been inhibited by its
adoption of the slowly-growing Chilean wine palm. Conrad
(2005) contends that the passenger pigeon in North America
satisfied the sufficiency condition in the late 191h century,
when it was destined for extinction, although he acknowl-
edges that q is difficult to estimate due to a lack of data.
Regulations or policy may be able to bring about sus-
tainability. It is natural to be optimistic: The growth function
for the resource (G(S) = rS(f - S/K), where S is the resource
stock and K is the carrying capacity) is symmetric about S =
K/2, which detenllines the maximum sustainable harvest. A
limit on the immediate harvest may allow the resource to
grow so that it sustains a larger harvest than before, increas-
ing utility.
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However, a policy or regulation can affect a society only
if it is actually adopted. If the policy requires people to re-
duce their consumption below the level of subsistence, they
will ignore it. Brander and Taylor do not consider a subsis-
tence level; in fact, they implausibly assume that if the re-
source base collapses, then people will continue to devote a
fixed share of their time to manufacturing rather than allocat-
ing more time than before to harvesting the resource.
Pezzey and Anderies (2003) further modify the Brander
and Taylor model by imposing a subsistence level of con-
sumption. As the harvest per capita falls toward a minimum
level of consumption, people began to harvest more and
manufacture less. They note that Easter Islanders manufac-
tured no more stone statues after about AD 1500. In the Pez-
zey and Anderies (2003) model, people only comply with
taxes and regulations if they remain above subsistence. The
researchers' results are discouraging. Allowing for a subsis-
tence minimum increases the possibility of collapse; people
struggle to survive by expending more effort on the harvest, a
strategy that exacerbates the problem of inadequate resource
growth.
But common-property regimes in some traditional so-
cieties appear sustainable. In the South Pacific kingdom of
Tonga, on the island of Lofanga, people have apparently pro-
tected the fishery indirectly by adopting a scheme of infonnal
insurance. Once the fishennan satisfies the needs of his fam-
ily, he must share his remaining catch with the community. In
effect, he pays an insurance premium for the times when he is
sick or unlucky and must share the catch of others to survive
(Bender et aI., 2002). This insurance may prevent him from
over-fishing on occasion in order to build up a stock that will
see him through during illness. Bender et al. acknowledge
that the insurance may also induce a moral hazard: confident
that others will take care of him, the fishennan may refuse to
fish.
Indigenous cultures may also develop rules for sustain-
ability. Erickson and Gowdy (2000) tell of Tikopia, which
stabilized its population at 1,000, apparently at the urging of
its chief, whose annual proclamation called for zero popula-
tion growth. This was before the Europeans an"ived. The
Tikopians also replaced slash-and-burn agriculture with fruit
and nut trees and also eliminated pigs. In the 20th century,
however, Christian missionaries exhorted the population to
increase. By the 1950s, the population had exceeded the car-
rying capacity of the island. Cyclones during that decade
were followed by famine and decimation of the population.
Drawing from the experience of Tikopia, Erickson and
Gowdy suggest that both resource conservation and institu-
tional adaptation are important in achieving a stable popula-
tion.
Anderies (2000) offers the Tsembega as counterpoint to
Easter Island. The Tsembega, like the islanders of Tikopia,
developed sustainable practices to manage common-property
forest resources (and control their population). The Tsembega
inhabit a mountainous area in New Guinea's Jimi and Simbai
river valleys. Other groups who share the Maring language
live in the same area of ew Guinea, with whom they have
both peaceful and martial interactions.
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While the Tsembega raise pigs, pork is not an important
food source for them. Instead, pork is important in their ritu-
als and pigs perfonn an advanced warning function, much
like canaries in mines. According to Rappaport (1968), pig
and human populations both grow until the work for raising
pigs becomes too great, at which point the pigs of the Tsem-
bega begin to invade the gardens of their neighboring peo-
ples. This often leads to the death of the owner of the pig at
the hands of the invaded gardener. Records of these garden-
revenge killings are kept so that they may be avenged at the
next ritually sanctioned war with these neighbors. Pigs pro-
vide a meter of population pressure and provide an estimate
of the number of people who must be killed to get to the
"right" population size. When enough Tsembega have been
killed, a Kaika is called, which involves slaughtering most of
the pig population, giving it to allies to help gain their sup-
port, and releasing the Tsembega from the taboo of conflict
with neighbors. Warfare ends when both sides agree that there
has been enough killing. The human and pig populations have
been reset to a lower level, and the process starts all over.
Anderies changes the utility function for Easter Island-
ers from the Cobb-Douglas function used by B&T seen above
as equation (4) to a Stone-Geary type function:
(IS)
where hmin is the per capita level of the harvest or re-
source good necessary for subsistence.
Anderies (2000) uses a Stone-Geary utility function that
allows effort in harvesting to increase with increased scarcity
beyond the subsistence level. He notes that as resource goods
becomes scarcer, labor is used less in manufacturing and
more in harvesting - delaying the date of any population
crash, but making the crash more severe once it occurs. There
is an abrupt cessation of manufacturing in his model, just as
the Easter Islanders rather suddenly stopped maai construc-
tion (though it seems that they increased their manufacturing
of tools of war at about the same time!)
Anderies suggests that it is more realistic to suppose that
once the per person harvest falls below a certain threshold, a
subsistence threshold, that the islanders tumed their attention
away from manufachlring and toward resource harvesting.
This reduces consumption of manufactured goods as they
become cheaper relative to harvested or resource goods, or
alternatively, increase the proportion of labor devoted to the
harvest as the resource good becomes so scarce that the popu-
lation no longer can subsist on it.
Anderies suggests that the Tsembega institutions depend
on their "geometry," or rather their spatial relationship with
the rest of the environment - in particular, their proximity to
neighbors on whom war can be waged to keep the population
in check. He also suggests that the Tsembega solution may
not have worked for Easter Island because of the difference in
proximity to neighbors. While war was part of the solution
for Easter Island, unlike for the Tsembega, there seemed to be
no rules or taboos that governed how the war played out,
leading to overshooting the martial solution. With Anderies'
subsistence modification of the B&T Easter Island model,
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collapse comes very rapidly. It is unlikely that anyone would
have noticed a problem with their resource use; institutional
change, even if implemented, would have come too late.
In the period of prosperity on Rapa Nui, chiefdoms of-
ten competed by having grander moai constructed. In a multi-
chief regime, no single chief and no single tribal group has
sufficient concern for protecting bird or tree species for the
future, in the same way that no single fishennan has sufficient
concern for the survival of fish species to prevent over-
fishing. However, after the collapse, the multi-chief regime
was replaced by a single-chief regime with the birdman cult
(Routledge 19 I7), in which the chief changed each year. This
may have been the beginning of a more sustainable regime.
We may never know for sure, because in the 1860s, which
was somewhat early in this rebound period, ships arrived
from South America and carried off approximately 2000 is-
landers to slavery. They were treated so poorly that most died
within a year of capture. Europeans also introduced the is-
landers to a new religion, as well as to new germs, smallpox,
which also killed many. In 1877 only II 0 Rapa Nui islanders
remained (Lee 2006a).
TECHNOLOGY, POPULATION AND THEIR I TERACTION
WITH PROPERTY-RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
EARLY THEORIES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH were concerned
more with investment in capital, which is investment in hu-
man tools and equipment. As the capital/labor ratio increases,
there is more equipment per worker and workers become
more productive and income per person increases. However,
as the capital labor ratio increases, the rate of increases, out-
put (or income) per person increases, but at a falling rate, so
the rate of economic growth falls. Technological advances
may keep economic growth rate from falling, though. First
efforts in including technological change made arbitrary as-
sumptions about the rate of teclmological advance, technol-
ogy progressed, but it was independent, or exogenous, of the
economic model. Technological changes were later explained
within dynamic economic models as being due to factors,
such as population, educational levels, and property rights
institutions, especially intellectual property rights institutions,
such as patents, as these institutions shape incentives to inno-
vate, thus, technological change becomes endogenous to the
model. See, for instance, Romer (1990) and Gailor and Weil
(2000), and Binswanger (I 978).
Lucas (1967) discusses aggregate technology growth in
tenns of an investment model and uses U.S. manufacturing
data to show that interest rates affect the rate of productivity
growth. Following Lucas, Binswanger (1978) examines tech-
nological growth within an investment framework, showing
that different input price ratios lead to different paths of inno-
vation, with higher relative wages leading to technological
advances that tend to economize on labor. This is relevant to
the Polynesian economy because the sustainability of harvests
often depend upon investment in improved harvesting tech-
nologies. Investment is made in harvesting teclmology, since
it leads to a greater expected appropriable return, as long as




of the investment. If the return is not appropriable (because
supportive property-rights structures do not exist), then the
investment is not made. This applies as well to investments in
technology that can increase the growth rate of a renewable
resource or to increase the carrying capacity of environment.
Boserup (1965) discusses the role of population growth
in changing relative prices of final goods; these price changes
lead to changes in agricultural practices and growth in food
supplies. Simon (1996) points out that higher population and
technology growth are positively related for two reasons.
First, technological advances bring about temporarily higher
per capita incomes that lead to higher populations. Second,
following Boserup, Simon suggests that population growth
leads to higher demands for final goods, inducing tecImologi-
cal advance, an idea well expressed by the saying "necessity
is the mother of invention." Technological growth depends on
conditions other than just population growth. Simon
(1996:372-73) points out two mediating factors to the popula-
tion-technology relationship: the rule of law and the incen-
tives that implies an educational attainment.
Reuveny and Decker (2000) observe that the two stan-
dard approaches for escaping the Malthusian fate are modify-
ing human institutions and changing technology. They ana-
lyze the effects of technological progress and changes in fer-
tility through population control reform within the basic pa-
rameters of the B&T model. They examine three indicators:
population, the renewable resource stock, and per capita util-
ity. Their simulations analyze both steady-state equilibria and
inter-temporal processes.
Technological change in resource growth leads to re-
source stability with either logaritiunic or exponential pro-
gress, and human population stability in the case of logarith-
mic progress, and population growth with exponential pro-
gress. Obviously, the Malthusian disaster strikes earlier and
more catastrophically when technological progress occurs in
harvesting. The fluctuations in population and resource stock
are greater than in the base case with logarithmic progress,
and the human population is obliterated with exponential pro-
gress. Reductions in fertility rates through some sort of social
control lead to smaller fluctuations in population and the re-
source stock, converging to a smaller human population and a
larger resource stock. All in all, Reuveny and Decker (2000)
do not find much hope for technological progress solving the
Malthusian problem, but rather, greater hope for a solution in
population control.
Decker and Reuveny (2005) alter their technological
progress model (Reuveny and Decker 2000) to take into ac-
count the views of Boserup (J 965) and Simon (1996) who
have suggested that technological progress should be thought
of as endogenous to the human social system and as related to
both the degree of resource scarcity and to the size of the hu-
man population. For instance, as Diamond (2005) points out,
there is evidence that Easter Island fanners developed lithic
mulched gardens to reduce evaporation in their soil (also see
Stevenson, et al. 2005 and Stevenson and Haoa 1998). Decker
and Reuveny show that Boserup/Simon endogenous techno-
logical progress, when applied to harvesting efficiency, carry-
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ing capacity and resource growth rate, fail to save Easter Is-
land from its ruinous collapse.
Decker and Reuveny (2005) model technological pro-
gress as a stock variable that accumulates over time and that
cannot be negative. When examining the steady state of their
dynamic system, they find that there are no interior solutions.
Instead, these are only two comer solutions: one in which
both people and the resource have vanished, and the other
where the resource has grown to its carrying capacity because
the human population disappeared before having a chance to
push the resource stock to extinction.
Decker and Reuveny (2005) conduct four simulations.
The first is the Brander and Taylor base case with no innova-
tion; the second involves innovation in harvesting, calTying
capacity and resource growth separately, as did their Reuveny
and Decker (2000) work. Third, they examine each of these
cases under different assumptions about the roles of popula-
tion size and resource scarcity in promoting technological
progress. Finally, they consider different combinations of
growth in harvesting, carrying capacity and resource growth.
Their results with endogenous growth do not vary substan-
tially from their results with exogenous growth. Compared to
the Brander and Taylor base case, human populations are sus-
tained longer and in better condition when there is techno-
logical progress in the resource growth rate, while people do
worse than in the base case when there is technological pro-
gress in harvesting.
At first, it may appear that a cutback in consumption
must surely extend the life of the resource. However, part of
the unconsumed resource may be devoted instead to the
manufacture of investment goods. If a tree is not cut down for
firewood, it may serve instead to produce canoes. A high sav-
ings rate that finances investment goods may thus hasten the
end of the resource. Anderies (2003) confimls this intuition in
a dynamic analysis of an economy that has two sectors
(agriculture and manufacturing) and that equates savings to
investment. Under some conditions, moderately high savings
rates lead the economy into perpetual overshoot and collapse.
Extremely high savings rates, however, lead to a stable equi-
librium: When people save most of their income, they eat
little, so the population grows too slowly to strip the resource.
Anderies (2003) explicitly models the demographic
transition, which is the change in a society from one with a
high rate of population growth accompanied by a high mor-
tality rate to one with a low rate of population growth accom-
panied by a low mortality rate. As discussed, moderate sav-
ings rates in his model may lead to boom-and-bust cycles,
because they enable firms to procure exhaustible resources
for manufacturing investment goods. But boom-and-bust
need not result if the increase in income leads to a sharp de-
crease in fertility and thus in new demand for the resource. In
fact, the economy may converge to a stable equilibrium, de-
spite moderate savings.
Like Reuveny and Decker, Anderies is skeptical that
technological change can permanently avoid overshoot and
collapse. In his 2003 model, random improvements in pro-
ductivity merely hasten the onset of boom and bust, by step-
ping up production and thus overusing the resource.
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What about innovations that reduce the harvest rate for a
given level of production? Anderies (2003:237) reports on the
scenario in which new technology can reduce the economic
impact on the resource indefinitely. That impact, he finds,
will approach zero in five generations while the population
will grow perpetually. Anderies dismisses this outcome, with-
out explanation, as "implausible". It is more likely that the
laws of physics will confound further technological progress,
which may bring us back to overshoot and collapse; or that an
exogenous constraint, like global warming, will slow growth;
or that nations may adopt population controls.
Dalton, Coats and Asrabadi (2005) extend the analysis
of institutional reform on Easter Island by incorporating
Simon's insights about the relationship between technology
and institution. Like Binswanger, Dalton, Coats and Asrabadi
focus on the technologies that may be developed and the role
of relative prices in the mix of developed technologies. They
look at two dimensions for technological development in the
Brander and Taylor model: technologies that increase the
growth of the resource and those that increase the harvest
rate. If the harvested resource is a common-propelty resource,
then the payoff of increasing the growth rate of the resource
is likely to be far below the payoff of increasing the harvest,
so technological development will be greater in efforts that
increase the harvest rate than in efforts that increase the rate
of growth of the resource. They show that private propelty
rights in the resource encourage growth in the resource rela-
tive to harvesting it, subduing the feast-famine cycle.
WAR, ApPROPRIATION BY VIOLENCE
ONE MAY EXPECT THAT, AS A RESOURCE such as a forest be-
comes scarcer, people will devote more time to appropriating
the resource through violence. There are three basic ways in
which people can elicit cooperation from others for the use of
resources: trade, charity, and force. Economic theory suggests
that people will use the least costly means at their disposal to
reach their goals, so that if they find the total costs, including
the moral or psychological costs of doing wrong, of acquisi-
tion by violence to be less than the costs of acquisition by
trade, then they will choose violent means. The cost of using
violence includes the risk of placing oneself in harm's way in
addition to the risk of being caught and punished by authori-
ties. When a person's chance of survival falls (without resOlt-
ing to violence) to a very low level, then his costs of using
violence, in terms of placing himself in harm's way, falls as
well, as he has little to lose.
Malthus noted that famine and war were checks on
population growth. Famine and its results, of course, are ex-
amined in the basic Brander and Taylor (1998) model. We
have already discussed the institutions of the Tsembega and
how their institutions led to population control through sched-
uled or triggered violent conflicts. Anderies (2000). Maxwell
and Reuveny (2000) and Grossman and Mendoza (2003) ex-
amine resource scarcity as an important factor contributing to
violent conflicts.
Maxwell and Reuveny (2000) note the increased pres-
sure that the world's population places on its resources and
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they ask how societies might react to increasing resource
scarcity. In less developed societies, property rights are often
poorly defined and enforced, teclmology investments cannot
be made because of their extreme poverty and people depend
heavily on the ecosystem. In their model, conflict has three
effects. Unlike Anderies (2000, 2003) and Pezzey and Ander-
ies (2003) who assume that when the resource harvest reaches
a certain minimal state that increased resources will be de-
voted to harvesting, Maxwell and Reuveny use a minimum
per capita harvest to trigger a state of violent conflict. This
leads to a diminution of resources devoted to harvesting,
since conflict redirects labor from production to violent ap-
propriation. Conflict reduces population pressure on re-
sources by increasing the death rate. It may also cut the re-
source growth rate.
Maxwell and Reuveny find that conflict due to scarcity
does not continue forever. Population and the resource base
might settle to a steady-state equilibrium that assures no fu-
ture scarcity-based conflict. External shocks can increase
resource scarcity, triggering contlict. Technological change
can either increase or decrease the chance of resource-based
conflict, as some technologies weaken the resource stock and
others may strengthen it or help to curb population growth,
such as birth control technologies. Surprisingly, Maxwell and
Reuveny find that high resource growth rates may actually
increase the duration of contlict, though scarcity-induced
conflict is less likely. The higher duration of conflict occurs
because the population does not fall as quickly.
Grossman and Mendoza (2003) demonstrate this for-
mally. They show that if each person spends the same share
of time harvesting, the resource endowment is fully exploited
when people maximize the CUITent utility of consumption as
well as the expected utility of survival (assuming that every-
one has the same utility function). If the resource is scarce
enough, and survival is valuable enough, then everyone
spends all of his time harvesting. Even when one splits his
time between harvesting and leisure, he will harvest a lot
more when the resource becomes scarce or when he expects
the resource to become abundant (because this increases the
value to him of survival). Paradoxically, if he expects the
resource to become more abundant, then he may devote so
much time now to harvesting that his total utility over time
drops.
The utility function used by Grossman and Mendoza is
unusual in this literature. Papers typically assume, after
Brander and Taylor, that people will maximize instantaneous
utility in the absence of property rights to protect their claims
to future utility. Another innovation of Grossman and Men-
doza is to model explicitly the impact of consumption on sur-
vival.
OTHER FINDINGS
THE WORK I ECONOMICS, using Brander and Taylor's model,
has been theoretical with little more than case studies as veri-
fication. However, there has been work done concerning
Easter Island by those in the social sciences. In a book re-
cently reviewed in this joumal (Y. Lee 2005), Diamond
(2005) provides an excellent overview of the apparent history
of Easter Island, based on the essential archaeological litera-
ture, as well as on the modem post-European history of this
mysterious island. Among the details Diamond discusses is
the evidence of agricultural intensification - that is, techno-
logical advancement from irrigation technologies, stone
chicken houses, and rock gardening or lithic mulch agricul-
ture found in many arid regions - to reduce the evaporation of
moisture from the soil, to provide slow-release fertilizer
through leaching of minerals from the stones, and to reduce
the variability in soil temperatures.
Rolett and Diamond (2004:445), using various statistical
models of deforestation and forest replacement over 69 Poly-
nesian islands in the Pacific, find support for Brander and
Taylor's contention that it was the climate and growing con-
ditions on Easter Island that brought about its collapse. They
conclude that, "Easter's collapse was not because its people
were especially improvident but because they faced one of
the Pacific's most-fragile envirofLIllents." Diamond (2005)
notes that only three islands in the Hawaiian chain - Necker,
Nihoa and Ni'ihau - come close to Easter in the extent of
deforestation suffered, islands which are all much drier than
Easter, and that there is little evidence to suggest that Necker
ever had trees. II
Diamond (2005: lIS) credits his co-author, Barry Rolett,
in their work in Nature (Rolett and Diamond 2004) for comb-
ing through journals of early explorers and finding descrip-
tions of the islands and acquiring a metric for deforestation
on 81 islands. They tabulated nine physical factors that had
sufficient variation to explain different deforestation out-
comes. Diamond (2005) summarizes these factors as:
• moisture
• cooler high-latitude islands vs. warmer equatorial
islands
• old vs. young volcanic islands (the latter have better
soil)
• aerial volcanic ash fallout (again, nutrient)
• island altitude
• remoteness or proximity to neighbors - the people of
remote islands have no neighboring islands to visit, to
trade with, so they have more time to devote to defor-
estation activities, 1110ai construction.
• small vs. big islands
• islands near or far from Central Asia's dust plume
• islands with and without makatea. (Makatea is an
island of coral, where volcanoes pushed a reef up
from the ocean.)
Rolett and Diamond's 2004 statistical work predicts that
the most deforested islands would be Easter Island and the
dry, deforested Hawaiian Islands of Necker and Nihoa.
Diamond (2005: 119) states:
II Georgia Lee (2006b), in correspondencc, notes that the Hawaiian island of Kaho'olawe also suffered severe deforcstation.
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The parallels between Easter Island and the whole
modem world are chillingly obvious. Thanks to
globalization, international trade, jet planes, and
the Intemet, all countries on Earth today share
resources and affect each other, just as did Easter's
dozen clans. Polynesian Easter Island was as
isolated in the Pacific Ocean as the Earth is today
in space. When the Easter Islanders got into
difficulties, there was nowhere to which they could
flee, nor to which they could tum for help; nor
shall we modem Earthlings have recourse
elsewhere if our troubles increase. Those are the
reasons why people see the collapse of Easter
Island society as a metaphor, a worst-case
scenario, for what may lie ahead of us in our own
future.
Of course, the metaphor is imperfect. ...
Diamond also mentions that our technological abilities
to over-harvest, over-fish, over-hunt, and destroy the very
resources that allowed our population to grow so great, far
surpasses the technologies available to those on Easter Island.
In his final chapter, Diamond claims that he is neither a pessi-
mist nor an optimist; instead, he remains cautiously optimistic
because he sees people making very long-term plans that of-
ten involve immediate sacrifice.
CONCLUSIONS
ECONOMISTS HAVE STUDiED the collapse of Easter Island and
developed and modified mathematical models to simulate
population and resource use, not for the sake of Easter Island
itself, as certainly these models are not intended to predict
future economic conditions on Rapa Nui, Rather, economists
intend to use the island, as did Balm and Flenley in the title of
their 1992 book, Easter Island, Earth Island, as a metaphor
for the planet. Perhaps the prevailing view of economists
working with Brander and Taylor's (1998) model of Easter
Island is well summed up by Decker and Reuveny (2005: 120)
who suggest that they
... do not seek to contribute to knowledge on Easter
Island per se, and our analysis could be developed
with respect to a purely 'hypothetical' closed
system. However, the traditional environmental
interpretation of the Easter Island collapse suits
our purposes here.
Malthus pointed out that human populations tend to
outstrip their ability to sustain themselves, but that famine is
not inevitable, as institutions and war can keep the starvation
equilibrium at bay. Since Malthus, some work, such as the
Club of Rome's well-known The Limits to Growth (Meadows
et al. 1972), present a very pessimistic view of the future of
mankind, predicting plummeting resource availabilities, in-
comes and populations. These dire predictions mirror what
many think occurred on Rapa Nui.
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Since Malthus, teclmology has been seen by some, such
as Julian Simon (1996) as potentially saving us from collapse.
Trade and migration, along with institutions, teclmology, war
and even famine have kept the entire Earth from being driven
to constant famine. But the Earth is as much a closed system
as was Easter Island, and trade and migration can only stave
off local disaster. Perhaps tecImology can push back the day
of reckoning, but social institutions of some sort are all we
have, in the end as a means of combating population pressure.
Even for technology to flourish, the rule of law and property
institutions must be well established so that people have an
incentive to be innovative; also, an educated population must
be in place. We should also be careful not to trust that we can
use institutional means that work well in large, modem socie-
ties in societies that are less advanced. Similarly, what works
for a small, isolated society may not work in a large, diverse,
but interconnected global society.
Diamond is correct in noting that the metaphor, "Easter
Island as Earth," is less than perfect. For one, those on Easter
Island did not have the technological capabilities that we
have, such as technology that allows us to do better at con-
serving resources. Also, in its prehistoric period, it now seems
that Easter Island had much more interaction with the other
Pacific islands and with South America than the earth will
have with beings and places beyond earth's boundaries. More
importantly, however, Easter Islanders did not have the re-
sults of institutional experiments conducted in thousands of
societies at their disposal for review. In many parts of the
world, population growth rates have fallen, with sub-Saharan
Africa remaining the most problematic, so that it seems many
areas have begun to enter the stage of demographic transition,
with both falling death rates and even greater declines in birth
rates. Greater individual responsibility for the care and ex-
pense of children, instead of allowing these costs to be bome
by the society as a whole, enables us to avoid the overpopula-
tion problem Hardin (1968) discussed in his "The Tragedy of
the Commons." By changing the responsibility of bearing and
raising children from a "commons" where the society at large
bears these costs, to one of individual responsibility, incen-
tives to have children are drastically reduced (for instance,
see Tietenberg 2004).
By the same token, removing resources from the realm
of "the commons" enhances sustainability. In a commons, the
price of harvestable resources only reflects the cost of harvest
and not the cost of future scarcity. The price of resources un-
der private property rights includes a return due to expected
future scarcity, the individual owner weighs extracting or
harvesting now and selling at today's prices against the future
price available from harvesting and selling in the future. The
demands of future generations are carefully weighed in the
process, boosting the price and cutting current consumption
so that the resource will be available for the future. While
Easter Island is an important metaphor for the earth and the
possibility of social collapse from over-harvesting resources,
the story of societal collapse of Easter Island could be mere
myth. The population collapse may have had its roots in some
sort of invasion. Rainbird (2002), for instance, suggests that
contact with Europeans led to Easter Island's partial, but dras-
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tic, depopulation. Other possibilities abound (see Diamond,
2005).
We know that the dreadful fate of those who occupied
Easter Island during its social upheaval cannot be changed,
but perhaps, by studying likely paths of population and re-
source stocks over time and comparing these paths to those
based on predictions made from altering certain parameters of
the model due to institutional and technological change, we
can learn ways to avoid making Easter Island's past Earth's
future.
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